Noriyo Isozaki

Under what conditions do the congress members revise the election-related law that might influence their own positions? This paper examined such a general question through the comparison between the fundamental change of party organization such as the abolition of local branch in South Korea in 2004 and its failure in 2000. This paper discovered the following points. First, the electoral system to which parliament member is punished easily by the voters must exist. Second, incumbent members agreement to law revision depends on what frame interpreting the social phenomenon is offered to the voters. In our case, what made the incumbent members who persisted in their partisan policy package accept non-partisan policy package was the successful presentation by the election administration committee as an independent actor to the voters of the frame which locates the abolition of local branch in non-partisan policy package. However now, such a model is tested only in the cases where many of voters are low in the party identity, and have distrust in the party like South Korea. This model can be applied also in other cases, but the elaboration of the applicable condition is future tasks.