磯崎 典世

Abstract This chapter analyzes how South Korea, despite adopting democratic institutions at independence in 1948, quickly transitioned into a personal dictatorship under President Syngman Rhee. After liberation from Japanese colonial rule and three years under US military occupation, a democratic system was introduced, but the process of decolonization empowered charismatic independence activists over institutional actors. Rhee, a long-exiled nationalist leader, used mass mobilization and anti-trusteeship rhetoric to gain popular legitimacy. Although initially constrained by democratic institutions and lacking strong party backing, he manipulated constitutional amendments, suppressed opposition, and exploited Cold War anti-communism to consolidate power. Rhee’s dictatorship—justified through elections and nationalism—was enabled by weak party institutionalization and inherited colonial administrative structures. The regime collapsed in 1960 following widespread protests against election fraud. The chapter argues that South Korea’s first political regime deviated from democratic paths not due to Cold War imposition, but through a homegrown personalist trajectory rooted in the politics of decolonization and weak democratic foundations.

This paper explores why the development policy and redistribution policy in South Korea has been changed in such a short time during 15years after Asian Financial Crisis, and insists that the party system is the cause for these policy changes, political turmoil. At first, the Kim Dae-jung administration pushed economic reform and restructuring recommended by the International Monetary Fund, partly because it seemed to weaken the social base of the opposition party. Then, under the Roh Moo-hyun and the Lee Myungbak administration, the development and the welfare policy has become the most important issue, but it has been swayed largely in a short period. As the existing major political parties in South Korea doesn't represent the demand of society and bond with its social base through their behavior, the policy orientation of the party and the voters' preference change on every election. The existing party system without representation and accountability causes this politics influx in South Korea.

Under what conditions do the congress members revise the election-related law that might influence their own positions? This paper examined such a general question through the comparison between the fundamental change of party organization such as the abolition of local branch in South Korea in 2004 and its failure in 2000. This paper discovered the following points. First, the electoral system to which parliament member is punished easily by the voters must exist. Second, incumbent members agreement to law revision depends on what frame interpreting the social phenomenon is offered to the voters. In our case, what made the incumbent members who persisted in their partisan policy package accept non-partisan policy package was the successful presentation by the election administration committee as an independent actor to the voters of the frame which locates the abolition of local branch in non-partisan policy package. However now, such a model is tested only in the cases where many of voters are low in the party identity, and have distrust in the party like South Korea. This model can be applied also in other cases, but the elaboration of the applicable condition is future tasks.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the Kim Dae－Jung government's policy towards North Korea in the context of domestic politics in South Korea． Kim's'Sunshine Policy'was aimed at promoting reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea and had characteristics that distinguished it from previous policies． It forswore measures to undermine or threaten North Korea， while promoting peaceful co－existence not to hasten reunification． In addition to working toward d6tente on the Korean Penillsula， Kim's engagement policy aimed to achieve systematic domestic reform． It proposed a program of structural reforms under the slogan of'the parallel development of democracy and the market ecollomy'as a strategy to recover from the financial crisis that had beset the country． In order to implement this program， Kim's government emphasized the need for'dissolution of the Cold War structure'． This was the rationale for the engagement policy． Moreover， the government stressed the importance of peace on the Korean Peninsula not only for national security， but a正so for the inflow of fore重gn capital needed for eCOnOm1C「eCOVe「y・ Although the policy toward North Korea was implemented as a part of the comprehensive reform program， it has become a main issue independently in conflicts over domestic politics． Since South Korean politics had long been dominated by vested interests framed around conservative Cold War ideology and institutions， the policy shift toward the'dissolution of the Cold War structure'stimulated ideological conflict in South Korea， transforming the previous regionalist structure of' 垂盾撃奄狽奄モ≠戟@conflict into one based on political ideology．