佐々木 康朗

This paper discusses rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (RSCE) in static games with unawareness that captures steady states of such games. We begin by defining the equilibrium concept in terms of its epistemic conditions. k-RSCE is a situation in which agents make rational choices and have correct beliefs about one another’s choices, and moreover these can be mutual belief to the k-th order. We then present an alternative definition that dispenses with these epistemic conditions and allows us to obtain equilibria through iterative eliminations of certain action profiles. In standard static games, k-RSCE reduces to Nash equilibrium, but not under unawareness. We examine the equilibrium concept’s properties and clarify its relationships with other equilibrium concepts for games with unawareness.

In recent years, technology firms have been facing a highly competitive environment on a global scale. The firms are accelerating to establish R&D sites abroad in order to access global knowledge resources. In this context, global R&D projects have become more complex and R&D bridge managers (BMs), who facilitate global research collaboration, play a pivotal role here. This study aims to investigate the difficulties that BMs are facing and to explore the roles of BMs in global R&D projects. We interviewed nine BMs who have facilitated global R&D projects and propose a model depicting four common and critical difficulties present in facilitating research collaboration between teams in the home country and foreign R&D teams. The unique contribution of this paper focuses on the individual managerial level, while most previous studies on global R&D mainly focused on an organizational level.