椋 寛

<title>Abstract</title>We explore the new roles of rules of origin (ROO) when multinational enterprises (MNEs) manipulate their transfer prices to avoid a high corporate tax. The ROO under a free trade agreement (FTA) require exporters to identify the origin of exports to be eligible for a preferential tariff rate. We find that a value-added criterion of ROO restricts abusive transfer pricing by MNEs. Interestingly, an FTA with ROO can induce MNEs to shift profits from a low- to high-tax country. Because the ROO augment tax revenues inside FTA countries, they can transform a welfare-reducing FTA into a welfare-improving one.

<title>Abstract</title> We examine the impact of free trade agreement (FTA) use on import prices. For this analysis, we employ establishment-level import data with information on tariff schemes, that is, the FTA and most-favored-nation schemes used for importing. Unlike previous studies, we estimate the effects of FTA use on prices by controlling for differences in importing-firm characteristics. There are three main findings. First, the effect of FTA use is overestimated when not controlling for importing firm-related fixed effects. Second, on average, firms’ FTA use reduces tariffs by 12 percentage points and raises import prices by 3.6–6.7 percent. Third, in general, we do not find a price rise resulting from the costs of complying with rules of origin.

We analyze the provision of repair services (aftermarket services that are required for a certain fraction of durable units after sales) through an international duopoly model in which a domestic firm and a foreign firm compete in the domestic market. Trade liberalization in goods, if not accompanied by the liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) in services, induces the domestic firm to establish service facilities for repairing the foreign firm's products. This weakens the firms' competition in the product market, and the resulting anti-competitive effect hurts consumers and reduces world welfare. Despite the anti-competitive effect, trade liberalization may also hurt the foreign firm because the repairs reduce the sales of the imported good in the product market. Liberalization of service FDI helps resolve the problem because it induces the foreign firm to establish service facilities for its own products.

This paper studies sequential negotiations of bilateral free-trade agreements in an oligopoly model. The expansion of trading blocs through overlapping trade agreements allows the option of hub-and-spoke systems and achieves multilateral free trade as the equilibrium path, even if the expansion of trading blocs through the acceptance of new members is not feasible. The results suggest that free-trade areas (FTAs) tend to expand more than customs unions (CUs). Lobbying by a producer can either promote or undermine the achievement of multilateral free trade through overlapping FTAs. © 2006 The Authors Journal compilation © 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.