Tetsuo Wada

This article addresses the following question: How do family firms investing less in research and development (R&D) than nonfamily firms compete in R&D intensive industries? Using Japanese pharmaceutical industry data, we found that family firms produce more patents per R&D than nonfamily firms but are not biased toward low-value innovations. Further analyses of the distribution over innovation value suggested that family firms adopt a “contact-hitting R&D strategy,” avoiding radical innovations and pursuing incremental innovations compatible with their signature moves: innovation through tradition and narrow and internal search and resulting in may low-value innovations and a few mid or high-value innovations.

Despite many empirical studies having been carried out on examiner patent citations, few have scrutinized the obstacles to prior art searching when adding patent citations during patent prosecution at patent offices. This analysis takes advantage of the longitudinal gap between an International Search Report (ISR) as required by the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) and subsequent national examination procedures. We investigate whether several kinds of distance actually affect the probability that prior art is detected at the time of an ISR; this occurs much earlier than in national phase examinations. Based on triadic PCT applications between 2002 and 2005 for the trilateral patent offices (the European Patent Office, the US Patent and Trademark Office, and the Japan Patent Office) and their family-level citations made by the trilateral offices, we find evidence that geographical distance negatively affects the probability of capture of prior patents in an ISR. In addition, the technological complexity of an application negatively affects the probability of capture, whereas the volume of forward citations of prior art affects it positively. These results demonstrate the presence of obstacles to searching at patent offices, and suggest ways to design work sharing by patent offices, such that the duplication of search costs arises only when patent office search horizons overlap.