MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES 49(2) 179-199 2005年3月
We consider a barter market with multiple types of indivisible goods. Konishi et al. [J. Math. Econ. 35 (2001) 1-15] showed that the core of this market may be empty. We define a normal form game for this market and consider its equilibrium outcom...
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH 29(4) 861-877 2004年11月
We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley and Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preferences allowed. It is well known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single valued, or multi valued. We define a condition on such ga...
MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH 29(4) 861-877 2004年11月
We consider the n-player houseswapping game of Shapley and Scarf (1974), with indifferences in preferences allowed. It is well known that the strict core of such a game may be empty, single valued, or multi valued. We define a condition on such ga...
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