阪口 功

This article aims to provide a comprehensive explanation for Japan's withdrawal from the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and research-based pelagic whaling operations. While the key factors underlying these withdrawals were the low profitability of special permit whaling (SPW) due to shrinking whale meat demand and the aging of pelagic whaling vessels, these alone cannot fully explain Japan's action as it did not need to leave the IWC if it were willing to end SPW. Therefore, additional factors need to be considered to explain Japan's withdrawal, such as changes in domestic political processes. First, the decline in the profitability of SPW led to the disintegration of the “iron triangle” composed of bureaucrats, industry, and lawmakers that had provided political and financial support for SPW in the Antarctic. Japan decided to leave the Antarctic Ocean because fisheries bureaucrats were less willing to provide the large subsidies needed to continue SPW, which included whaling fleet replacement costs. Furthermore, the final decision to leave the IWC was attributable to the strengthened power of politicians in Japanese decision-making processes. Second, with the weakened influence of the whaling industry, whose core interest lied in the continuation of SPW, the relative clout of the ruling politicians increased. Finally, the prime minister's power in the decision-making process was further strengthened, enabling the final decision to leave the IWC.

Humanity has never benefited more from the ocean as a source of food, livelihoods, and well-being, yet on a global scale this has been accompanied by trajectories of degradation and persistent inequity. Awareness of this has spurred policymakers to develop an expanding network of ocean governance instruments, catalyzed civil society pressure on the public and private sector, and motivated engagement by the general public as consumers and constituents. Among local communities, diverse examples of stewardship have rested on the foundation of care, knowledge and agency. But does an analog for stewardship exist in the context of globally active multinational corporations? Here, we consider the seafood industry and its efforts to navigate this new reality through private governance. We examine paradigmatic events in the history of the sustainable seafood movement, from seafood boycotts in the 1970s through to the emergence of certification measures, benchmarks, and diverse voluntary environmental programs. We note four dimensions of stewardship in which efforts by actors within the seafood industry have aligned with theoretical concepts of stewardship, which we describe as (1) moving beyond compliance, (2) taking a systems perspective, (3) living with uncertainty, and (4) understanding humans as embedded elements of the biosphere. In conclusion, we identify emerging stewardship challenges for the seafood industry and suggest the urgent need to embrace a broader notion of ocean stewardship that extends beyond seafood.

<title>Abstract</title> Asia-Pacific lacks an environmental leader. Japan, a forerunner of environmental regulation in the 1970s, started to engage in active environmental diplomacy in the post-Cold War era by hosting conferences of parties to multilateral environmental agreements such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as well as providing a massive amount of environmental aid. Then, in the 2000s, Japan’s initiatives became substantially weakened and have gained a negative international reputation as the country took a considerably passive position to the Paris Agreement, filed many reservations to the CITES listing decisions, and withdrew from the International Whaling Commission. This article explores, through six brief case studies, the factors and structures that systemically impede Japan’s environmental leadership and norm internalization. It highlights the constraining factors behind Japan’s devolution including its closed bureaucratic system and the lack of positive engagement of Japanese scientists. Finally, it addresses the future prospects of environmental cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.