Faculty of International Social Sciences

Jun Wako

  (和光 純)

Profile Information

Affiliation
Faculty of Economics, Department of Economics, Gakushuin University

J-GLOBAL ID
200901053048790717
researchmap Member ID
1000189056

External link

Misc.

 34
  • 和光純, 大久保直樹, 山下純司, 久保山哲司, 村上登志男
    学習院大学計算機センター年報, 37 27-37, Mar, 2017  
  • Japanese journal of health economics & policy, 23(1) 5-20, Oct, 2011  
  • Jun Wako
    ALGORITHMICA, 58(1) 188-220, Sep, 2010  
    This paper considers von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets in marriage games. Ehlers (Journal of Economic Theory 134: 537-547, 2007) showed that if a vNM stable set exists in a marriage game, the set is a maximal distributive lattice of matchings that includes all core matchings. To determine what matchings form a vNM stable set, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a man-optimal matching and a woman-optimal matching in a vNM stable set of a given marriage game. This algorithm also generates a modified preference profile such that a vNM stable set is obtained as the core of a marriage game with the modified preference profile. It is well known that cores of marriage games are nonempty. However, the nonemptiness of cores does not imply the existence of a vNM stable set. It is proved using our algorithm that there exists a unique vNM stable set for any marriage game.
  • Jun Wako
    Algorithmica (New York), 58(1) 188-220, Sep, 2010  
    This paper considers von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets in marriage games. Ehlers (Journal of Economic Theory 134: 537-547, 2007) showed that if a vNM stable set exists in a marriage game, the set is a maximal distributive lattice of matchings that includes all core matchings. To determine what matchings form a vNM stable set, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a man-optimal matching and a woman-optimal matching in a vNM stable set of a given marriage game. This algorithm also generates a modified preference profile such that a vNM stable set is obtained as the core of a marriage game with the modified preference profile. It is well known that cores of marriage games are nonempty. However, the nonemptiness of cores does not imply the existence of a vNM stable set. It is proved using our algorithm that there exists a unique vNM stable set for any marriage game. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
  • Jun Wako, Shigeo Muto
    Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science, 2009