CVClient

和光 純

ワコウ ジユン  (Jun Wako)

基本情報

所属
学習院大学 経済学部 経済学科 教授

J-GLOBAL ID
200901053048790717
researchmap会員ID
1000189056

外部リンク

MISC

 34
  • 和光純, 大久保直樹, 山下純司, 久保山哲司, 村上登志男
    学習院大学計算機センター年報 37 27-37 2017年3月  
  • 鎌田雄一郎, 小島武仁, 和光純
    医療経済研究 23(1) 5-20 2011年10月  
  • Jun Wako
    ALGORITHMICA 58(1) 188-220 2010年9月  
    This paper considers von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets in marriage games. Ehlers (Journal of Economic Theory 134: 537-547, 2007) showed that if a vNM stable set exists in a marriage game, the set is a maximal distributive lattice of matchings that includes all core matchings. To determine what matchings form a vNM stable set, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a man-optimal matching and a woman-optimal matching in a vNM stable set of a given marriage game. This algorithm also generates a modified preference profile such that a vNM stable set is obtained as the core of a marriage game with the modified preference profile. It is well known that cores of marriage games are nonempty. However, the nonemptiness of cores does not imply the existence of a vNM stable set. It is proved using our algorithm that there exists a unique vNM stable set for any marriage game.
  • Jun Wako
    Algorithmica (New York) 58(1) 188-220 2010年9月  
    This paper considers von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable sets in marriage games. Ehlers (Journal of Economic Theory 134: 537-547, 2007) showed that if a vNM stable set exists in a marriage game, the set is a maximal distributive lattice of matchings that includes all core matchings. To determine what matchings form a vNM stable set, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a man-optimal matching and a woman-optimal matching in a vNM stable set of a given marriage game. This algorithm also generates a modified preference profile such that a vNM stable set is obtained as the core of a marriage game with the modified preference profile. It is well known that cores of marriage games are nonempty. However, the nonemptiness of cores does not imply the existence of a vNM stable set. It is proved using our algorithm that there exists a unique vNM stable set for any marriage game. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
  • Jun Wako, Shigeo Muto
    Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science 2009年  

共同研究・競争的資金等の研究課題

 2