江藤 名保子

日本国際問題研究所 平成28年度外務省外交・安全保障調査研究事業「国際秩序動揺期における米中の動勢と米中関係」報告書『中国の国内情勢と対外政策』

Chinese nationalism tends to excessively react to some specific problems which oppose to Japan, USA or West European countries in particular. This "anti-West" sentiment of the Chinese society has been regarded as the "trauma" of invasion by the Great Powers. Yet when reviewing Chinese cognition after the national foundation in 1949, there were the times when Chinese nationalism expanded without connecting to the "anti-West" assessment. For example, despite the rise of "patriotism" in the 1980s, Chinese public opinion took a conciliatory attitude to the Western countries, especially to Japan. Similarly, it was observed that while the nationalism kept on surging, Chinese public sentiments towards Japan continuously improved from 2006 to 2010. These phenomena can't be explained by a simple logic that "the surge of nationalism promotes anti-foreignism." <BR>This paper hypothesizes the contemporary Chinese nationalism as multiple political thought in order to examine the dynamism of its "anti-West" logics. Here, the centripetal force of Chinese official nationalism is extracted as the four elements; national identity, socialism, economic development and notion of great power. Using these factors, this paper discusses the mechanism how Chinese nationalism links to the "anti-West" sentiments. <BR>In conclusion, this paper argues that the "anti-West" sentiments is not only an extension of the historical trauma, but it is also promoted by official nationalism. At the same time, however, it is also pointed out two elements of the official nationalism—economic development and notion of great power—functioned to offset the public "anti-West" feelings.

During the 70s, the Chinese domestic political system and the East Asian Cold War order faced simultaneous structural changes. It was inevitable that each change mutually affected the other, yet the existent research has not adequately examined how they impacted Japan-China relations. This paper addresses the main factors which influenced Chinese policy toward Japan, dealing with the case of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty negotiation.<br>This paper seeks to capture the dynamics of domestic and international factors in the Chinese decision making process at three turning-points in the negotiation: interruption in fall 1975, resumption in September 1977 and the final stage of negotiations from May to August, 1978. The basic purpose here is to reexamine Japan-China relations as a part of an integrated Chinese diplomacy, which is conventionally analyzed as bilateral relations.<br>In the first chapter, the reasons for the discontinuation and the resumption of negotiations by China are explained. Since East Asian affairs were becoming more relaxed at the time, this paper rejects the speculation that China was motivated by a strong intention to make Japan into an anti-Soviet ally. Rather, China was temporarily less motivated to cooperate with Japan due to domestic political disorder. The domestic power struggle took precedence over advancing economic relations with Japan.<br>The second chapter focuses on what motivated China's sudden change in decision making from May, 1978. In May, China agreed to structure a new security coalition with the US, to supplement the US alliances in East Asia. The United States and China shared a common interest in normalization and excluding Soviet power from the Korean Peninsula. By summer, moreover, out of fear that Vietnam might normalize relations with the US, China hurried to promote cooperative relationships with US allies in East Asia. Consequently, the conclusion of the Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan gained a new strategic significance, which motivated China to conclude negotiations rapidly. In any evaluation of the meaning of the Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty, it is impossible to ignore the role of the US factor.<br>During the negotiations, the specific bilateral problems between Japan and China, such as history, territory, and Taiwan were not dealt with. Instead, the new East Asian power balance was constructed and maintained during the 80s. The Japan-China relationship was also stabilized in the context of the international system, which resulted in the steady development of the bilateral relationship. Leaving outstanding issues unresolved, however, sowed the seeds of future conflict. In the conclusion, this paper maintains that the complex international context was key to China's decision to shelve its problems with Japan. The Chinese decision was rational given their strategic concerns.