Horiuchi and Ishikawa (2007) examine the relationship between tariffs on the final good and international technology transfer through trade in an intermediate good. They show that a decrease in the tariff as well as an increase may lead the North monopolist to transfer technology to a South potential entrant. This paper shows that tariff-reductions may induce technology transfer even if technologytransfer competition among multiple North firms is taken into account.
Japan and the World Economy 15(1) 31-46 2003年1月 査読有り
In the framework of international Cournot oligopoly, we analyze welfare-enhancing<br />
policies when policymakers have only limited information on demand and cost structures.<br />
We show that even if policymakers have no idea about costs and demand, they<br />
can raise welfare by introducing a small production subsidy. If the government knows<br />
that demand is not very convex, a small tariff can be used to enhance welfare. With<br />
strategic complements, a small import reduction by an import quota deteriorates welfare<br />
while a small increase in the number of domestic firms improves welfare. In other<br />
cases, some more information is required to determine right policies.
This paper sets out a single monopoly model and examines the effects of various trade policies on domestic, foreign and world economies under both segmented and integrated markets. In the segmented~markets case, the spillover effects which stem from non~constant marginal costs are explicitly dealt with. In the integrated-markets case, trade policies are examined in two different notions of market integration. It is shown that the curvature of demand curves are crucial for results and that trade restrictions taken by one country may benefit the other country and/or the world economy.
Review of International Economics 6(1) 129-141 1998年 査読有り
Using a simple Cournot-oligopoly model, the paper examines the effects of voluntary export restraints (VERs) on profits, market shares, consumers' surplus, and domestic welfare when the domestic market is open to foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports from a third country. A VER may induce FDI from the VER-restricted country or exports from the third country. Under certain circumstances, the domestic firm loses from a VER. Even if the domestic firm gains, the increase in the market share of the domestic country induced by the VER could be less than that of the third country.
This note further develops Ikema's (1990, 1991) diagrammatic demonstration of the Cournot-oligopoly equilibrium on the price-quantity plane. It is shown that Ikema's method can be used to illustrate the Stackelberg and Bertrand equilibria on the price-quantity plane. Furthermore, we algebraically derive the "monopoly-equilibrium" curve and show that the Cournot-oligopoly equilibrium is stable if the monopoly-equilibrium curves for all producers are upward sloping.